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Split DNS Configuration
for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)

Abstract

This document defines two Configuration Payload Attribute Types (INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA) for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2). These payloads add support for private (internal-only) DNS domains. These domains are intended to be resolved using non-public DNS servers that are only reachable through the IPsec connection. DNS resolution for other domains remains unchanged. These Configuration Payloads only apply to split-tunnel configurations.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

Split-tunnel Virtual Private Network (VPN) configurations only send packets with a specific destination IP range, usually chosen from [RFC1918], via the VPN. All other traffic is not sent via the VPN. This allows an enterprise deployment to offer remote access VPN services without needing to accept and forward all the non-enterprise-related network traffic generated by their remote users. Resources within the enterprise can be accessed by the user via the VPN, while all other traffic generated by the user is not sent over the VPN.

These internal resources tend to only have internal-only DNS names and require the use of special internal-only DNS servers to get resolved. Split DNS [RFC2775] is commonly configured as part of split-tunnel VPN configurations to allow remote access users to use special internal-only domain names.

The IKEv2 protocol [RFC7296] negotiates configuration parameters using Configuration Payload Attribute Types. This document defines two Configuration Payload Attribute Types that add support for trusted Split DNS domains.

The INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute type is used to convey that the specified DNS domain MUST be resolved using the provided DNS nameserver IP addresses as specified in the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS Configuration Payloads, causing these requests to use the IPsec connection.

The INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute type is used to convey a DNSSEC trust anchor for such a domain. This is required if the external view uses DNSSEC, which would prove the internal view does not exist or would expect a different DNSSEC key on the different versions (internal and external) of the enterprise domain.

If an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN is sent by the responder, the responder MUST also include one or more INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes that contain the IPv4 or IPv6 address of the internal DNS server.

For the purposes of this document, DNS resolution servers accessible through an IPsec connection will be referred to as "internal DNS servers", and other DNS servers will be referred to as "external DNS servers".

Other tunnel-establishment protocols already support the assignment of Split DNS domains. For example, there are proprietary extensions to IKEv1 that allow a server to assign Split DNS domains to a client.

However, the IKEv2 standard does not include a method to configure this option. This document defines a standard way to negotiate this option for IKEv2.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Applicability

If the negotiated IPsec connection is not a split-tunnel configuration, the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Payloads MUST be ignored. This prevents generic (non-enterprise) VPN services from overriding the public DNS hierarchy, which could lead to malicious overrides of DNS and DNSSEC.

Such configurations SHOULD instead use only the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS Configuration Payloads to ensure all of the user's DNS traffic is sent through the IPsec connection and does not leak unencrypted information onto the local network, as the local network is often explicitly exempted from IPsec encryption.

For split-tunnel configurations, an enterprise can require one or more DNS domains to be resolved via internal DNS servers. This can be a special domain, such as "corp.example.com" for an enterprise that is publicly known to use "example.com". In this case, the remote user needs to be informed what the internal-only domain names are and what the IP addresses of the internal DNS servers are. An enterprise can also run a different version of its public domain on its internal network. In that case, the VPN client is instructed to send DNS queries for the enterprise public domain (e.g., "example.com") to the internal DNS servers. A configuration for this deployment scenario is referred to as a Split DNS configuration.

Split DNS configurations are often preferable to sending all DNS queries to the enterprise. This allows the remote user to only send DNS queries for the enterprise to the internal DNS servers. The enterprise remains unaware of all non-enterprise (DNS) activity of the user. It also allows the enterprise DNS servers to only be configured for the enterprise DNS domains, which removes the legal and technical responsibility of the enterprise to resolve every DNS domain potentially asked for by the remote user.

A client using these Configuration Payloads will be able to request and receive Split DNS configurations using the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA configuration attributes. These attributes MUST be accompanied by one or more INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS configuration attributes. The client device can then use the internal DNS server(s) for any DNS queries within the assigned domains. DNS queries for other domains SHOULD be sent to the regular DNS service of the client unless it prefers to use the IPsec tunnel for all its DNS queries. For example, the client could trust the IPsec-provided DNS servers more than the locally provided DNS servers, especially in the case of connecting to unknown or untrusted networks (e.g., coffee shops or hotel networks). Or the client could prefer the IPsec-based DNS servers because they provide additional features compared to the local DNS servers.

3. Protocol Exchange

In order to negotiate which domains are considered internal to an IKEv2 tunnel, initiators indicate support for Split DNS in their CFG_REQUEST payloads, and responders assign internal domains (and DNSSEC trust anchors) in their CFG_REPLY payloads. When Split DNS has been negotiated, the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS DNS server configuration attributes will be interpreted as internal DNS servers that can resolve hostnames within the internal domains.

3.1. Configuration Request

To indicate support for Split DNS, an initiator includes one or more INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes as defined in Section 4 as part of the CFG_REQUEST payload. If an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute is included in the CFG_REQUEST, the initiator MUST also include one or more INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes in the CFG_REQUEST.

The INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute sent by the initiator is usually empty but MAY contain a suggested domain name.

The absence of INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in the CFG_REQUEST payload indicates that the initiator does not support or is unwilling to accept a Split DNS configuration.

To indicate support for receiving DNSSEC trust anchors for Split DNS domains, an initiator includes one or more INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes as defined in Section 4 as part of the CFG_REQUEST payload. If an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute is included in the CFG_REQUEST, the initiator MUST also include one or more INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in the CFG_REQUEST. If the initiator

includes an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute but does not include an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, the responder MAY still respond with both INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA and INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes.

An initiator MAY convey its current DNSSEC trust anchors for the domain specified in the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute. A responder can use this information to determine that it does not need to send a different trust anchor. If the initiator does not wish to convey this information, it MUST use a length of 0.

The absence of INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes in the CFG_REQUEST payload indicates that the initiator does not support or is unwilling to accept the DNSSEC trust anchor configuration.

3.2. Configuration Reply

Responders MAY send one or more INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in their CFG_REPLY payload. If an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute is included in the CFG_REPLY, the responder MUST also include one or both of the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes in the CFG_REPLY. These DNS server configurations are necessary to define which servers can receive queries for hostnames in internal domains. If the CFG_REQUEST included an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute but the CFG_REPLY does not include an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, the initiator MUST behave as if Split DNS configurations are not supported by the server, unless the initiator has been configured with local policy to define a set of Split DNS domains to use by default.

Each INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN represents a domain that the DNS server addresses listed in INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS can resolve.

If the CFG_REQUEST included INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes with non-zero lengths, the content MAY be ignored or be interpreted as a suggestion by the responder.

For each DNS domain specified in an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, one or more INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes MAY be included by the responder. This attribute lists the corresponding internal DNSSEC trust anchor information of a DS record (see [RFC4034]). The INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute MUST immediately follow the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute that it applies to.

3.3. Mapping DNS Servers to Domains

All DNS servers provided in the CFG_REPLY MUST support resolving hostnames within all INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN domains. In other words, the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in a CFG_REPLY payload form a single list of Split DNS domains that applies to the entire list of INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes.

3.4. Example Exchanges

3.4.1. Simple Case

In this example exchange, the initiator requests INTERNAL_IP4_DNS, INTERNAL_IP6_DNS, and INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in the CFG_REQUEST but does not specify any value for either. This indicates that it supports Split DNS but has no preference for which DNS requests will be routed through the tunnel.

The responder replies with two DNS server addresses and two internal domains, "example.com" and "city.other.test".

Any subsequent DNS queries from the initiator for domains such as "www.example.com" SHOULD use 198.51.100.2 or 198.51.100.4 to resolve.

```
CP (CFG_REQUEST) =  
INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS()  
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS()  
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS()  
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS()  
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN()
```

```
CP (CFG_REPLY) =  
INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS(198.51.100.234)  
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.2)  
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.4)  
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS(2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5/64)  
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS(2001:DB8:99:88:77:66:55:44)  
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(example.com)  
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(city.other.test)
```

3.4.2. Requesting Domains and DNSSEC Trust Anchors

In this example exchange, the initiator requests INTERNAL_IP4_DNS, INTERNAL_IP6_DNS, INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes in the CFG_REQUEST.

Any subsequent DNS queries from the initiator for domains such as "www.example.com" or "city.other.test" would be DNSSEC validated using the DNSSEC trust anchor received in the CFG_REPLY.

In this example, the initiator has no existing DNSSEC trust anchors for the requested domain. The "example.com" domain has DNSSEC trust anchors that are returned, while the "other.test" domain has no DNSSEC trust anchors.


```
CP (CFG_REQUEST) =  
INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS ()  
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS ()  
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS ()  
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS ()  
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN ()  
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA ()
```

```
CP (CFG_REPLY) =  
INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS (198.51.100.234)  
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS (198.51.100.2)  
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS (198.51.100.4)  
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS (2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5/64)  
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS (2001:DB8:99:88:77:66:55:44)  
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN (example.com)  
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA (43547,8,1,B6225AB2CC613E0DCA7962BDC2342EA4...)  
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA (31406,8,2,F78CF3344F72137235098ECBBD08947C...)  
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN (city.other.test)
```


4. Payload Formats

All multi-octet fields representing integers are laid out in big-endian order (also known as "most significant byte first" or "network byte order").

4.1. INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Attribute Type Request and Reply




- o Reserved (1 bit) - Defined in IKEv2 RFC [RFC7296].
- o Attribute Type (15 bits) - set to value 25 for INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN.
- o Length (2 octets) - Length of domain name.
- o Domain Name (0 or more octets) - A Fully Qualified Domain Name used for Split DNS rules, such as "example.com", in DNS presentation format and using an Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA) A-label [RFC5890]. Implementors need to be careful that this value is not null terminated.

4.2. INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Attribute


An INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Attribute can either be empty, or it can contain one trust anchor by containing a non-zero Length with a DNSKEY Key Tag, DNSKEY Algorithm, Digest Type and Digest Data fields.

An empty INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA CFG attribute:



- o Reserved (1 bit) - Defined in IKEv2 RFC [RFC7296].
- o Attribute Type (15 bits) - set to value 26 for INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA.
- o Length (2 octets) - Set to 0 for an empty attribute.

A non-empty INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA CFG attribute:



- o Reserved (1 bit) - Defined in IKEv2 RFC [RFC7296].
- o Attribute Type (15 bits) - set to value 26 for INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA.
- o Length (2 octets) - Length of DNSSEC trust anchor data (4 octets plus the length of the Digest Data).
- o DNSKEY Key Tag (2 octets) - Delegation Signer (DS) Key Tag as specified in Section 5.1 of [RFC4034].
- o DNSKEY Algorithm (1 octet) - DNSKEY algorithm value from the IANA DNS Security Algorithm Numbers Registry.
- o Digest Type (1 octet) - DS algorithm value from the IANA Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) Type Digest Algorithms Registry.
- o Digest Data (1 or more octets) - The DNSKEY digest as specified in Section 5.1 of [RFC4034] in presentation format.

Each INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute in the CFG_REPLY payload MUST immediately follow a corresponding INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute. As the INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA format itself does not contain the domain name, it relies on the preceding INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN to provide the domain for which it specifies the trust anchor. Any INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute that is not immediately preceded by an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN or another INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute applying to the same domain name MUST be ignored.

5. INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Usage Guidelines

If a CFG_REPLY payload contains no INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes, the client MAY use the provided INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS servers as the default DNS server(s) for all queries.

If a client is configured by local policy to only accept a limited set of INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN values, the client MUST ignore any other INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN values.

For each INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN entry in a CFG_REPLY payload that is not prohibited by local policy, the client MUST use the provided INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS DNS servers as the only resolvers for the listed domains and its subdomains, and it MUST NOT attempt to resolve the provided DNS domains using its external DNS servers. Other domain names SHOULD be resolved using some other external DNS resolver(s) that are configured independently from IKE. Queries for these other domains MAY be sent to the internal DNS resolver(s) listed in that CFG_REPLY message, but they have no guarantee of being answered. For example, if the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute specifies "example.test", then "example.test", "www.example.test", and "mail.eng.example.test" MUST be resolved using the internal DNS resolver(s), but "otherexample.test" and "ple.test" MUST NOT be resolved using the internal resolver and MUST use the system's external DNS resolver(s).

The initiator SHOULD allow the DNS domains listed in the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes to resolve to special IP address ranges, such as those of [RFC1918], even if the initiator host is otherwise configured to block a DNS answer containing these special IP address ranges.

When an IKE Security Association (SA) is terminated, the DNS forwarding MUST be unconfigured. This includes deleting the DNS forwarding rules; flushing all cached data for DNS domains provided by the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, including negative cache entries; removing any obtained DNSSEC trust anchors from the list of trust anchors; and clearing the outstanding DNS request queue.

INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes SHOULD only be used on split-tunnel configurations where only a subset of traffic is routed into a private remote network using the IPsec connection. If all traffic is routed over the IPsec connection, the existing global INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS can be used without creating specific DNS or DNSSEC exemptions.

6. INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Usage Guidelines

DNS records can be used to publish specific records containing trust anchors for applications. The most common record type is the TLSA record specified in [RFC6698]. This DNS record type publishes which Certification Authority (CA) certificate or End Entity (EE) certificate to expect for a certain host name. These records are protected by DNSSEC and thus are trustable by the application. Whether to trust TLSA records instead of the traditional Web PKI depends on the local policy of the client. By accepting an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA trust anchor via IKE from the remote IKE server, the IPsec client might be allowing the remote IKE server to override the trusted certificates for TLS. Similar override concerns apply to other public key or fingerprint-based DNS records, such as OPENPGPKEY, SMIMEA, or IPSECKEY records.

Thus, installing an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA trust anchor can be seen as the equivalent of installing an Enterprise CA certificate. It allows the remote IKE/IPsec server to modify DNS answers, including DNSSEC cryptographic signatures, by overriding existing DNS information with a trust anchor conveyed via IKE and (temporarily) installed on the IKE client. Of specific concern is the overriding of TLSA records based on [RFC6698], which represents a confirmation or override of an existing Web PKI TLS certificate. Other DNS record types that convey cryptographic materials (public keys or fingerprints) are OPENPGPKEY, SMIMEA, SSHP, and IPSECKEY records.

IKE clients willing to accept INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes MUST use a whitelist of one or more domains that can be updated out of band. IKE clients with an empty whitelist MUST NOT use any INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes received over IKE. Such clients MAY interpret receiving an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute for a non-whitelisted domain as an indication that their local configuration may need to be updated out of band.

IKE clients should take care to only whitelist domains that apply to internal or managed domains rather than to generic Internet traffic. The DNS root zone (".") MUST be ignored if it appears in a whitelist. Other generic or public domains, such as Top-Level Domains (TLDs), similarly MUST be ignored if they appear in a whitelist unless the entity actually is the operator of the TLD. To determine this, an

implementation MAY interactively ask the user when a VPN profile is installed or activated to confirm this. Alternatively, it MAY provide a special override keyword in its provisioning configuration to ensure non-interactive agreement can be achieved only by the party provisioning the VPN client, who presumably is a trusted entity by the end user. Similarly, an entity might be using a special domain name, such as ".internal", for its internal-only view and might wish to force its provisioning system to accept such a domain in a Split DNS configuration.

Any updates to this whitelist of domain names MUST happen via explicit human interaction or by a trusted automated provision system to prevent malicious invisible installation of trust anchors in case of an IKE server compromise.

IKE clients SHOULD accept any INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA updates for subdomain names of the whitelisted domain names. For example, if "example.net" is whitelisted, then INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA received for "antartica.example.net" SHOULD be accepted.

IKE clients MUST ignore any received INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes for a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) for which it did not receive and accept an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Payload.

In most deployment scenarios, the IKE client has an expectation that it is connecting to a specific organization or enterprise using a split-network setup. A recommended policy would be to only accept INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA directives from that organization's DNS names. However, this might not be possible in all deployment scenarios, such as one where the IKE server is handing out a number of domains that are not within one parent domain.

7. IANA Considerations

This document defines two new IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types, which are allocated from the "IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types" namespace.

Value	Attribute Type	Multi-Valued	Length	Reference
25	INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN	YES	0 or more	RFC 8598
26	INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA	YES	0 or more	RFC 8598

Figure 1

8. Security Considerations

As stated in Section 2, if the negotiated IPsec connection is not a split-tunnel configuration, the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Payloads MUST be ignored. Otherwise, generic VPN service providers could maliciously override DNSSEC-based trust anchors of public DNS domains.

An initiator MUST only accept INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TAs for which it has a whitelist, since this mechanism allows the credential used to authenticate an IKEv2 association to be leveraged into authenticating credentials for other connections. Initiators should ensure that they have sufficient trust in the responder when using this mechanism. An initiator MAY treat a received INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA for a non-whitelisted domain as a signal to update the whitelist via a non-IKE provisioning mechanism. See Section 6 for additional security considerations for DNSSEC trust anchors.

The use of Split DNS configurations assigned by an IKEv2 responder is predicated on the trust established during IKE SA authentication. However, if IKEv2 is being negotiated with an anonymous or unknown endpoint (such as for Opportunistic Security [RFC7435]), the initiator MUST ignore Split DNS configurations assigned by the responder.

If a host connected to an authenticated IKE peer is connecting to another IKE peer that attempts to claim the same domain via the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, the IKE connection SHOULD only process the DNS information if the two connections are part of the same logical entity. Otherwise, the client SHOULD refuse the DNS information and potentially warn the end user. For example, if a VPN profile for "Example Corporation" is installed that provides two IPsec connections, one covering 192.168.100.0/24 and one covering 10.13.14.0/24, it could be that both connections negotiate the same INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA values. Since these are part of the same remote organization (or provisioning profile), the Configuration Payloads can be used. However, if a user installs two VPN profiles from two different unrelated independent entities, both could be configured to use the same domain -- for example, ".internal". These two connections MUST NOT be allowed to be active at the same time.

If the initiator is using DNSSEC validation for a domain in its public DNS view and it requests and receives an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute without an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA, it will need to reconfigure its DNS resolver to allow for an insecure delegation. It SHOULD NOT accept insecure delegations for domains that are DNSSEC signed in the

public DNS view for which it has not explicitly requested such delegation, i.e., for which it has not used an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN request to specify the domain.

Deployments that configure INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN domains should pay close attention to their use of indirect reference RRtypes in their internal-only domain names. Examples of such RRtypes are NS, CNAME, DNAME, MX, or SRV records. For example, if the MX record for "internal.example.com" points to "mx.internal.example.net", then both "internal.example.com" and "internal.example.net" should be sent using an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Payload.

IKE clients MAY want to require whitelisted domains for Top-Level Domains (TLDs) and Second-Level Domains (SLDs) to further prevent malicious DNS redirections for well-known domains. This prevents users from unknowingly giving DNS queries to third parties. This is even more important if those well-known domains are not deploying DNSSEC, as the VPN service provider could then even modify the DNS answers without detection.

The content of INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA may be passed to another (DNS) program for processing. As with any network input, the content SHOULD be considered untrusted and handled accordingly.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

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